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CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION AND
RELATED VARIABLES
The long-run trend of concentration will be examined in this chapter,
and changes during World War II will be studied in some detail. The
statistics available for this investigation deal with plants only, so that
firm concentration cannot be studied, and there is little infonnation
on changes in individual industries. Nevertheless, much can be
learned from an analysis of the available material.
1. Trends in Plant Concentration
MANUFACT(JPJNG AS A WHOLE
Concentration by plants for manufacturing as a whole showed re-
markable stability in the period between the wars (Table A-2). Apart
from minor year-to-year fluctuations, concentration of output re-
mained unchanged from 1922 to 1939, while concentration of employ-
ment diminished slightly. During World War II, however, concen-
tration increased sharply to a 1943 peak and then declined even more
sharply, so that the level of plant concentration in 1948 was well be-
low that of 1922—1939.
Comparable statistics are not available for the period before 1922
but there is some evidence that plant concentration for manufactur-
ing as a whole increased substantially between 1890 and 1922.'
These changes in concentration for manufacturing as a whole may
1In1922, 936 plants accounted for 66 per cent of the value of output, while
in 1890, 2,879 plants accounted for 63 per cent of output, and 1,673 plants ac-
counted for 54 per cent. The census of 1890, however, included certain indus-
tries omitted in 1922 in which small plants predominated. A completely accurate
adjustment for these industries cannot be made because of changes in industrial
classification, but the data indicate that these industries account for no more
than 10 per cent of output in 1890. Making the extreme assumption that none
of their plants were among the largest 1,678 plants, omission of these industries
in 1890 would raise the percentage of output accounted for by the largest 1,673
plants to 60 per cent. This still represents an appreciably lower level of coneen-
tration than that of 1922, The Manufacturing industries of Canada, 1922, and
Census of Canada, 1901, Ottawa, King's Printer, Vol. III, pp. 324—325.
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reflect changes in concentration within individual industries, but they
may also be affected by shifts in the relative size of industries with
high and low concentration, changes in the distribution of average
firm sizes of the different industries, and other changes. Changes in
concentration within industries cannot be analyzed for most of the
period under consideration, since plant-size distributions for indi-
vidual industries are only available in recent years. The effect of
shifts in the relative size of industries with high and iow concentra-
tion can, however, be examined, and compared with the trends in
over-all concentration just discussed. It will be assumed that where
the change in over-all concentration that would result from shifts in
the relative size of industries is in the opposite direction to the actual
change in over-all concentration, the latter must reflect mainly
changes in concentration within industries.
CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE SIZES OF INDUSTRIES
The influence of shifts in the relative size of industries with high
and low concentration will be studied by means of a sample of 47 in-
dustries consisting of those that are among the 38 largest industries
(in terms of employment) in any of the years 1922, 1929, 1939, 1943,
or 1948.2
2Thesample is used to study the change in a weighted average concentra-
tion index. Since concentration is negatively correlated with industry size (Chap-
ter II), the omission of small industries means that the sample understates con-
centration(i.e. overstates the numerical value of the average index). But
changes in the relative size of industries that are small and stay small are not
likely to have a significant effect on the direction of change of the weighted
average. Since there are about 180 industries altogether, much labor is saved
and little accuracy lost by confining the analysis to the largest industries. Changes
in industrial classification affecting the sampled industries have been taken into
account, but it would require an enormous amount of work to make the neces-
sary corrections for all industries.
Industries that are small in one period but large in another are included in
the sample, since it comprises those that are among the 38 largest in any of the
key years analyzed.








The following industries are included in the sample:
Bread and other bakery products, fish curing ana packing, butter and cheese,
slaughtering and meat packing; cocoa, confectionery, etc.; fruit and vegetable
preparations, flour and feed mills, cigars and cigarettes, biscuits and crackers,
breweries, soft drinks.CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION
If the plant concentration index for each of the 47 industries is held
constant at its 1948 level, the harmonic mean concentration







Since concentration ratios are held constant the variation shown in
this weighted average reflects only shifts in the weights. The average
index falls when industries with high concentration become rela-
tively larger and rises when the relative size of industries with. low
concentration increases.
Between 1922 and 1929 there was an increase in the relative im-
portance of industries with high concentration. Over half the increase
in the average concentration index is accounted for by the rise of the
automobile which had 1.6 per cent of total manufacturing
Men's clothing factories, cotton yarn and cloth, hosiery and knitted goods,
rubber goods, women's clothing factories, leather boots and shoes, synthetic tex-
tiles and silk, woolen cloth, leather tanneries, hats and caps.
Pulp and paper, printing and publishing, furniture, planing mills, sawmills,
miscellaneous paper products, paper boxes and bags, printing and bookbinding.
Primary iron and steel, nonferrous metals smelting and refining, railway rolling
stock, electrical apparatus, automobiles, machinery, agricultural implements,
sheet metal products, shipbuilding, machine shops, iron castings, aircraft, wire
and wire goods, bridge and structural steel.
Petroleum products, clay products; acids, alkalies and salts; scientific and pro-
fessional equipment.
3Numberof largest plants in an industry accounting for 80 per cent of
employment. The harmonic mean is the reciprocal of the weighted arithmetic
mean of the reciprocals of these indexes.
The harmonic mean is used because the frequency distribution of the con-
centration index is highly skewed towards the high numerical values, even when
frequency is measured in terms of employment (see Table 5 for the distribution
of the firm concentration index). Hence an arithmetic mean, which would be
very sensitive to the few industries with very high concentration numbers, would
be unrepresentative, while the harmonic mean is closer to the median value.
41.e. over half the increase in the weighted average of reciprocals is contrib-
uted by the automobile industry. The contribution of each industry to the change
in the weighted average between years I and jwascomputed as (c—
cisthe reciprocal of the industry's concentration index, w
is the industry's employment as a proportion of total employment in the sample
of 47 industries (so that= 1),and the subscripts 48, 1, andstand for the
respective years. Hence (c— representsthe industry's deviation from
average concentration in 1948 and (wi— wj) representsthe change in the in-
dustry's relative importance. The, sum, for all 47 industries, of the products of
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employment in 1922 and 2.5 per cent in 1929. Smaller contributions
to the increase were made by the nonferrous metals industry which
rose from 0.7 per cent of total manufacturing employment in 1922 to
1.2 per cent in 1929 and by the railway rolling stock industry which
increased from 2.0 per cent to 3.8 per cent of total employment in the
same period. On the other hand, such industries with typically low
concentrationmen's clothing and "printing and publishing"
declined in importance from 3.7 per cent to 3.2 per cent of total em-
ployment and from 3.0 per cent to 2.5 per cent respectively.
In the same period employment concentration for manufacturing as
a whole decreased slightly (Appendix A, Table A-2), so that it seems
probable that on the average there was a decrease in plant concentra-
tion within industries. This conclusion cannot, however, be estab-
lished beyond doubt since plant-size distributions for individual in-
dustries are not available.
Between 1929 and 1939 both the index of concentration for manu-
facturing as a whole and the weighted average of 1948 concentration.
indexes show great stability, suggesting that on the average there was
little change in concentration within industries, although again the
data are not sufficient to establish this conclusion with certainty.
Shifts in the relative importance of industries lowered the average
concentration index (i.e. raised the level of concentration) from 20.3
in 1939 to 12.9 in 1943. This change is almost entirely accounted for
by the growing importance of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries,
which expanded rapidly to meet war requirements.5 The aircraft
industry accounted for 0.8 per cent of total manufacturing employ-
ment in 1939 and 8.5 per cent in 1943, while shipbuilding rose from
0.7 per cent to 9.3 per cent. It seems likely therefore that the corres-
ponding wartime increase observed in the concentration index for
manufacturing as a whole (Appendix A, Table A-2) reflects the in-
creasing importance of war industries rather than .an increase in
concentration within industries.
From .1943 to 1948 the weighted average concentration index rose
the two expressions is equal to — i.e. the change in the weighted
average.
(If the simpler formula c( —w,)were used for an industry's contribution,
increasing relative size of an industry with low c would not appear to make any
contribution towards a fall in the average.)
Between 1922 and 1929 the change in the weighted average of reciprocals was
0.0081. The automobile industry contributed 0.0054, nonferrous metals ac-
counted for 0.0008, and other industries for smaller amounts.
The change in the weighted average of reciprocals was 0.029. The aircraft
industry contributed 0.019andshipbuilding accounted for 0.002.
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from 12.9 to 19.3; this indicates the declining relative
of industries with high concentration. Again, the major part of the
change is accounted for by the aircraft industry, with a smaller con-
tribution from shipbuilding. The former fell in importance from 8.5
per cent of total manufacturing employment in 1943 to 1 per cent in
1948, and the latter declined from 9.3 per cent to 2.3 per cent. Thus
the decline in over-all concentration over the same period (Table
A-2) must be attributed, in part at least, to the dealining importance
of war industries with high concentration.
CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION WITHIN INDUSTRIES
Changes in plant concentration within each of a limited sample of
industries can be studied for the later 1930's and the war and postwar
periods (Table A-6). Table 31, summarizing the wartime changes,
supports the conclusion that the wartime increase in concentration
for manufacturing as a whole is the result of the increasing impor-
tance of war industries. Only five of the sixteen industries examined
show an increase in concentration between 1936 or 1937 and 1943
(flour and feed mills, cotton yarn and cloth, butter and cheese, auto-
mobiles, leather tanning). In two of these industries (flour and feed
mills, butter and cheese) the increase appears to be part of a continu-
ing trend, since concentration rises further in the postwar period,
when most industries exhibit declining concentration. Increasing
plant concentration within industries was therefore not a typical
pattern in the wartime upswing of business.
There is a frequently encountered view that concentration tends
to rise in a war economy, when large firms get a disproportionate
share of war orders and government aid in plant expansion, while
the number of new entrants is limited by shortages and the accom-
panying controls. The trends in plant concentration reviewed here
do not support this view, but the interpretation of our findings is
subject to two important qualifications. First, there is no information
on changes in concentration by firms during this period. Second, while
concentration may not have increased, there is little doubt that the
war and the accompanying controls stimulated the development of
institutions, practices, and attitudes making for reduced competition.
Of 164 manufacturing and mining trade associations recqrded in
Canada in 1947,41 were founded in the period 1942—1944.° In the con-
trolled wartime economy "business men learned to work more closely
together and to accept, as a matter of common practice, the discus-
6Compiledfrom: 13th Report on Organization in Industry, Commerce, and
the Professions, Ottawa, Department of Labour, 1947.
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sion of aspects of their business which, under peacetime conditions
might have been regarded as matters of individual decision.""
Between 1943, the peak year of war employment, and 1948 there
was a further significant decline in plant concentration within in-
dustries. Thirteen of the sixteen industries examined show declining
plant concentration (Table 31), and the level of concentration in
1948 is lower than in 1936 in eight of the eleven industries for which
a direct comparison can be made.
TABLE 31




Automobiles 1.8 1.5 1.7
Nonferrous metals 4.1 6.1 5.4
Petroleum refining
Cotton yarn and cloth
10.8 11.3 11.8
15.4 14.9 16.3
Slaughtering & meat packing
Electrical apparatus & supplies
Pulp and paper mills
Women's clothing factories




281 a 348 529
283.9 226.5 184.3
Sawmills 554.0 1,418.1 1,993.7
Butter and cheese factories 894.5 645.2 442.0
CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION OF
OF OUTPUT b EMPLOYMENT b
1937 1943 1943 1948
•
Synthetic textiles and silk
Leather tanning
Paints and varnishes
7.9 9.2 10.1 13.8
16.9 15.1 18.4 19.3
20.0 22.4 24.7 26.6
Boots and shoes 77.7 84.6 92.5 110.7
Furniture 92.7 114.1, 120.6 287.2
a Figuresfor 1934.
b Number of largest plants accounting for 80 per cent of output or employ-
ment.
Source: Appendix A, Table A-6.
The decrease observed in the concentration index for manufactur-
ing as a whole between 1943 and 1948 therefore reflects• both the
shift from war to civilian industry after the peak of war production,
and decreasing concentration within many industries. The latter ap-
pears to be the result of the rapid expansion of business and of in-
dustrial capacity that followed the alleviation of wa.rtime shortages
and the removal of controls. The total number of manufacturing
Report of the Royal Commission on Prices, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1949,
Vol. H, p. 251.
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plants rose from 27.7 thousand in 1943 to 29.0 thousand in 1945 and
33.4 thousand in 1948, thus tending to reduce concentration.
2. Interpretation of the Long-Run Trend
The level of concentration for manufacturing as a whole was ap-
preciably lower in 1948 than in 1929 or 1922. Industries with high
concentration were, however, relatively more important at the latter
date, as shown by the change in the weighted average of 1948 con-
centration ratios discussed above. These facts suggest that the trend
in plant concentration within industries was probably on the average
downward rather than upward, over the period as a whole.
It is interesting to compare these changes in concentration with
the trends envisaged by well-known theories. There are many ver-
sions of the theory that increasing concentration is inherent in a
system of industrial capitalism. According to Marx, technical prog-
ress involves a continual substitution of machinery for labor, and the
use of more and larger machinery requires a continual increase in the
scale of production, which is made possible by the persistent accumu-
lation of capital on the part of individual capitalists. Larger plants, it
is implied, mean larger firms, hence fewer firms and higher concen-
tration. Large firms, producing more cheaply than the small, can
grow faster and finally eliminate the smaller competitor.8 Increasing
firm concentration is thus deduced from technological development
and increasing size of plant, but there is also a brief reference to the
development of a credit system, which makes it possible to draw
funds "scattered over the surface of society" into the hands of in-
dividual or associated capitalists, thus promoting concentration.9 A
similar view of increasing concentration based on internal economies
was shared by many later economists, and such economies were
stressed by the promoters of the trust movement of the
One of the latest and most explicit versions of the theory is that
of B. S. Keirstead who states that "we know on empirical grounds
that the facts of modern industry are that the number of firms tends
steadily to decline while the modal firm increases in size....The
reason for this is to be found in the typical technology of our period.
The process is to introduce new, more efficient machine units, in-
volving the substitution of machinery for labor, and thus increasing
8KarlMarx, Das Kapital, 2nd ed., Hamburg, Meissner, 1872, Vol. I, pp. 647—
651.
°Ibid.,p. 651.
10Cf.A. S. Dewing, Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations, Harvard
University Press, 1930, pp. 523—529.
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the scale of undertaking while altering in favor of fixed capital the
combination of the factors." j1Keirsteaddevelops dynamic models in
which the passage of time is defined in terms of this form of teáhno-
logical advance: "A unit of time, therefore, consists of the introduc-
tion of new, qualitatively different, machinery (or other fixed plant),
involving ordinarily an increase in size(p. 243).
The theories of increasing concentration based on technological
development have been attacked from a number of directions. There
is little doubt that both substitution of machinery for labor and in-
creasing scale of production characterized the change from handi-
craft production to a factory system, and in the early stages of factory
production the major improvements consisted in the increase of ma-
chine capacity and extension of mechanization to further processes.
It is not obvious, however, that this form of improvement must domi-
nate technical progress once production has been mechanized. In
fact, J. M. Blair suggests that the dominant trend of technological
progress since the end of World War I has been toward capital-saving
innovations and smaller average size of plant.12
Other writers have questioned the existence of the economies of
scale from which the theories of increasing concentration deduce the
superior power of large firms.'3 On this basis they have maintained
either that there is no trônd toward increasing concentration or that
growth of firm size is to be explained in terms of "opportunities for
promoter profit, personal ambitions of industrial and financial 'Na-
poleons' and advantages of monopoly power" 14ratherthan technical
developments.
Even if the existence of a trend toward increasing firm size is ac-
cepted, increasing concentration is by no means a necessary conse-
11B.S. Keirstead, The Theory of Economic Change, Toronto, Macmillan,
1948, pp.242—243(see also pp. 239—240 and note the qualifications on pp. 274—
275).
12
J•M. Blair, "Technology and Size," American Economic Review, May
1948, Pp. 121—152.
13E.g.,F. A. Fetter in Relative Efficiency of Large, Medium-sized and Small
Business, Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph 13, 1941, p.
404; Henry C. Simons, "A Positive Program for Laissez Faire" in Economic
Policy for a Free Society, University of Chicago Press, 1948; Corwin D. Ed-
wards, Maintaining Competition, McGraw Hill, 1949, pp. 113—120. These writ-
ers question the existence of such economies in the largest firms on the grounds
that economies of scale must be internal to the plant while the largest firms
in many industries have several plants. Other writers question the existence of
economies on the around that smaller firms are not, in fact, eliminated, e.g.
George J. Stigler, 'Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American Economic
Review, May 1950, p. 26.
14Simons,op. cit., p. 13.
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quence. Many writers have pointed Out that technical developments
have increased the size of the market by improvements in transporta-
tion, communications, packing, storage, etc., in addition to the in-
crease due to population growth. This growth of the market means
that concentration need not increase even when firms become larger.
The trends in concentration in Canada discussed above do not sup-
port a theory of increasing concentration, at least so far as plants are
concerned. There probably was such a trend in the period 1890 to
1920, as the figures for manufacturing as a whole suggest. In the
period since 1922, however, there is no evidence of increasing plant
concentration. There may, of course, have been an increase in firm
concentration based on the growing importance of multi-plant firms.
There is evidence of a substantial "merger wave" in the late 1920's 15
and,as discussed in Chapter III, in many of the industries in which
concentration is high and multi-plant firms are important, the lead-
ing firms owe much of their present size to mergers in that period. On
the other hand, in the majority of industries the number of plants per
firm was still very small in 1948, even among the largest firms,'6 so
that when the average of all industries is considered, it does not seem
likely that there was a substantial increase in concentration as a re-
suit of mergers. In any event such an increase could not be ascribed
to the.trend of technical development inside the plant envisaged by
the theories reviewed above.
An empirical examination of each of the propositions of the theory
of increasing concentration will indicate just why the theory as a
whole does not fit the developments in Canadian manufacturing.
Changes in the horsepower capacity of prime movers per employee
can serve as a rough index of the substiffition of capital for labor (see
Chapter II). While this ratio shows a strong counter-cyclical pattern
(Table A-5) because of the cyclical variation in employment, the
trend can be seen by comparing peak years of the business cycle.
This comparison indicates an upward trend between 1923 and 1948,
if the war period is omitted (Table 32, column 1). The low ratio for
1943 probably reflects the operation of an exceptional number of
shifts during the war. The high ratios for 1937 and 1939 reflect a sub-
stantial degree of excess capacity.'7 The sketchy data available for
the period preceding 1923 also indicate a rising trend.
Cf. Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, Ottawa King's
Printer,1935, p. 28. Out of a total of 374 mergers studied, 231 took place
between 1925 and 1930, and 58 in the period 1909—1912.
10SeeTable 22.
17Thepercentage of unemployment in the civilian labor force in Canada is
estimated at 8 per cent in June 1941 and was undoubtedly higher in 1939 and
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Does this trend of increasing mechanization for manufacturing as
a whole represent increasing mechanization within industries• or the
growing relative importance of industries with a high ratio of horse-
power per employee? Analysis of a sample of 47 industries18indicates
that if horsepower per employee for each industry had remained con-
stant at the 1939 level, the average for all industries would have fallen
from 9.3 in 1923 to 8.8 in 1948 showing the increasing relative impor-
TABLE 32
Horsepower per Employee in CanadianManufacturing Industries
47 Selected
Industries, Average of
1939 Ratios Weighted by














1923 4.2 4.7 9.3
1929 a 5.8 6.4 9.1
1937 7.1 .
1939 7.7 • 8.6 8.6
1943 5.2 5.9 8.4
1948 7.1 8.0 8.8
a Theratio in columns (1) and (2) is understated slightly relative to other
years because of a different method of computing annual average employment.
The sum of wage earners reported each month by an establishment is divided
by number of months of operation, while in other years it is divided by twelve.
bThe38 largest industries in terms of employment in 1922, 1929, 1939, 1943
and 1948 (see note 2, sec. 1).
Source: Appendix A, Table A-5; and The Manufacturing industries of
Canada) 1923, 1929, 1939, 1943, and 1948, Ottawa, Dominion Bureau of
Statistics.
tance of industries with a low ratio (Table 32). The increase shown
in the actual average between these dates (columns 1 and 2) there-
fore reflects increasing mechanization within industries.
For the earlier period a similar analysis has not been possible, but
there is little doubt that increasing mechanization characterized many
industries between 1890 and 1920. As a matter of fact, since industries
were classified partly on the basis of the process of production, some
1937. In June 1944, however, it was only 1.8 per cent and in June 1948, 1.6
per cent (Canadian. Statistical Review, August 1948, p. 2). Data for 10 major
United States industries analyzed by Bert G. Hickman at the National Bureau
of Economic Research (unpublished) indicate that in most cases the degree to
which capacity was utilized was lower in 1937 than in 1929, while the highest
level reached during the war was above that of 1929. The level for 1948 was
also well above 1929.
Consistingof those that are among the 38 largest industries in any of the
years 1922, 1929, 1939, 1943, 1948 (see note 2, section 1).
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of the shifts in the relative importance of industries represented in-
creasing mechanization in the production of a given end product.
Thus between 1890 and 1920 there was a relative decline of tailoring
and dressmaking while men's and women's clothing factories grew in
The trend in mechanization in Canadian manufacturing has there-
fore been in accord with that envisaged by the theories of increasing
concentration. Was increasing mechanization accompanied by a
growing size of plant?
TABLE 38
Size of Plant in Canadian Manufacturing Industries







of 1939 Ratios C
per Plant
(All Industries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1917 27.8 75.9
1922 21.7 21.7 26.0
1923 24.0 101.9
1929 a 30.0 30.8 27.1 173.6
1937 26.6 189.7
1939 26.5 26.5 26.5 • 203.4
1948 44.9 41.8 26.3 232.0
1948 34.6 35.2 26.6 243.9
a Numberof employees per plant in columns (1) and (2) overstated as
compared with other years (see Table 32, note a).
b Same as note b, Table 82.
An industry's weight in a given year is its number of plants in that year.
Source: Appendix A, Table A-5 and The Manufacturing industries of Canada,
1948, Ottawa, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, p. 7, also for the years 1922,
1929, 1939, and 1943.
The number of employees per plant (Tables A-5 and 33) was the
same in 1937 as in 1920 and exhibits cyclical variation but no definite
trend in the intervening period. It has been shown, however, that
mechanization was increasing, so that plant size, when measured in
terms of horsepower capacity, rose steadily (Table 33, column 4)
and there was probably an increase in capacity, measured in terms of
potential output. During World War II employment per plant rose
In1921, 66 per cent of employment in men's clothing was in factories and
34 per cent in custom tailoring establishments. In 1901 the proportion of em-
ployment recorded in factories was only 57 per cent, even though only estab-
lishrnents with 5 or more employees were enumerated.
in women's clothing the proportion of employment in factories was 88 per
cent in 1921 and only 33 per cent in 1901 even though establishments with less
than 5 employees were not enumerated in 1901. Canada Year Book, 1922—23,
and Census of Canada, 1901, Vol. 3, pp. 116—117.
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rapidly, and while there was a decline after the war, the level of 1948
remained well above prewar.2°
These changes in the average size of plant reflected changes within
industries, rather than variation in the relative importance (in terms
of number of plants) of industries with large and small plants. The
effect of changes in the relative importance of different industries, is
shown by the weighted average of 1939 employment-per-plant ratios,
using, each year, the number of plants in an industry as that industry's
weight (Table 33, column 3). The resulting average changes very
little between 1922 and 1948.
The trend in the period 1920 to 1948 was therefore toward in-
creasing plant capacity within industries. The available statistics do
not permit a comparison of plant size in 1890 and 1920 but it is prob-
able that plant size increased, as the factory replaced the workshop
in many industries during this period.21
The trends in plant size thus also correspond to those envisaged by
the theories of increasing concentration, yet the trend in plant con-
centration, as indicated above, does not. The reason is that the market
for manufactured goods grew more rapidly than the average size of
plant, so that the number of plants tended to increase (Table A-5).
The number of employees in manufacturing rose from 506 thousand
in 1923 to 660 thousand in 1937 and 1,241 thousand in 1943. While
there was a decline from this wartime peak, the number in 1948 was
1,156 thousand—well above the prewar level. The index of the volume
of manufacturing production (on the base 1935—1939 = 100) rose
from 67.5 in 1923 to 101.4 in 1929 and 107.8 in 1939. During the war
it rose abruptly to 217.3 in 1943, then declined to 169.0 in 1946 and
rose again to 192.1 in 1948.22 Changes in the current value of manu-
facturing output are shown in Table A-5.
The rising trend of output and employment in manufacturing re-
flects both the growth of the Canadian economy and the increasing
importance of manufacturing in the economy. Between 1923 and
20Anindex of real output per plant on the base 1935—1939 =100rose from
79 in 1923 to 112 in 1929 and fell only slightly, to 108,in1937. It thus rose
by 37 per cent between 1923 and 1937 while employment per plant (Table 83)
rose by only 11 per cent. The difference reflects in part the increasing mech-
anization discussed above. The index of real output per plant rose to 193 in
1943 and stood at 141 in 1948 (Source: Index of real output from The Manu-
facturing Industries of Canada, 1948, p. 16 and Canadian Statistical Review,
Ajiril 1951, p. 12. This index was divided by an index of number of plants,
computed from Appendix A, Table A-5).
21Seenote 19.
22TheManufacturing Industries of Canada, 1948, p. 16 and Canadian Sta-
tistical Review, April 1951, p. 12.
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1948 the population of Canada increased by 42 per cent while em-
ployment in manufacturing increased by 128 per cent.23 An essential
reason why plant concentration has not increased since 1922 is there-
fore to be found in the forces making for growth and industrializa-
tion in the Canadian economy.
While this is not the place for an analysis of these forces, some of
the immediate stimuli to the expansion of manufacturing will be
briefly reviewed. During the cyclical upswing of 1925 to 1929 the
increased demand for manufactures appears to have been mainly
consumer demand, reflecting the rise in real income per head and
(to a lesser extent) the increase in population (from 9 million in 1923
to 10 million in 1929). Exports played a major role in the great ex-
pansion of the automobile, newsprint, and nonferrous metals indus-
tries, but not in most of the other industries. Booming investment in
plant and equipment, largely in the manufacturing industries them-
selves, also absorbed a substantial portion of the increased output.24
In 1937 real gross national product was still slightly below its 1929
level (Table 2), but real manufacturing output was higher than in
1929, and the proportion of national income originating in manufac-
turing had increased. Substantial increases in tariff rates during the
23Appendix A, Table A-5 and Reference Paper 40, Ottawa, Dominion Bu-
reau of Statistics, February 1953.
24 See e.g.,M.Q. Innis, Economic His-tory of Canada, Toronto, Ryerson, 1943,
p. 319; V. W. Malach, "Internal Determinants of the Canadian Upswing, 1921—
29," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 16, 1950, pp.
184—198; National Accounts, Income and Expenditure, 1926—1950, Ottawa, Do-
minion Bureau of Statistics, December 1951, PP. 28—29.
The role of exports in the expansion was small for manufacturing as a whole
as shown by the following figures:
(dollars in billions)
1923 1929Increase
Total manufacturing output 2.7 3.9 1.2
Exports of partly or fully manufactured goods 0.6 0.7 0.1
But the importance of exports in the three industries mentioned in the text is
shown by the following figures:
(dollars in millions)
1923 1929 Increase
Newsprint output 93 151 58
Newsprint exports 78 142 69
Automobiles output 97 177 80
Automobiles exports 27 43 16
Nonferrous metals, smelters and refineries, output20 110 90
Nonferrous metals and products, exports 44 113 69
Source: Canada Year Book, 1924, 1925, 1930, and 1932, Ottawa, Dominion
Bureau of Statistics.
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depression were followed by a considerable reduction in the ratio of
imports to domestic output of many manufactures,25 and the estab-
lishment of numerous branch plants of United States corporations
in Canada. Table 34 illustrates the importance of the depression
period in reducing Canadian dependence on imported manufactures.
TABLE 34
Output and Imports of Manufactures in Canada
Value of Output Net Imports a
ofManufacturing of Fully or Partly
Industries Manufactured Goode Cot. 2 -i-- Cot. 1
(billions of dollars) (%)
1923 2.66 0.64 24
1929 3.88 0.94 24
1937 3.63 0.57 16
1944 9.07 1.30 14
1948 11.88 1.87 16
a Importsless re-exports.
Source: The Manufacturing




The nonferrous metals industries expanded strikingly with the
opening up of new ore deposits. Between 1929 and 1937 the net value
added in the smelting and refining of nonferrous metals rose from
$68.4 million to $101.8 million.
After the recession of 1938, manufacturing output expanded
rapidly in response to the war requirements of Canada and her allies
(including large demands for food and clothing). The estimated per-
centage of manufacturing employment directly devoted to war orders
rose from 9 per cent in 1939 to 37 per cent in 1941 and 64 per cent in
1943.26 After a brief period of declining output following the peak of
1944, expansion was resumed in 1946 under the stimulus of an un-
precedented investment boom.
Thus, in the period since 1920, expansion of the market has more
than offset the increase in plant size. As a result the number of plants
has increased from 21.1 thousand in 1923 to 33.4 thousand in 1948.
The degree of inequality of plant size has remained approximately
the same (Table A-2) so that concentration has declined. At the same
time the development of motor transportation and improvements in
railroad transportation have continued to break down the regional
2bCf.W. A. Mackintosh in Report of the Royal on Dominion
Provincial Relations, Appendix 3, The Economic Background of Dominion Pro-
vincial Relations, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939,Pp. 89—96.
Estimates from records of Department of Munitions and Supply quoted in
Private and Public Investment in Canada, 1926—51, Ottawa, Dept. of Trade and
Coinnierce, 1951, p. 37.
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segregation of markets, so that plant concentration by market areas
has probably declined.
Growth of the market is therefore revealed as an important factor,
which a theory of concentration cannot afford to neglect. Further
growth of the Canadian economy can be expected to exercise a con-
tinued moderating influence on the level of concentration. Should
concentration nevertheless increase, the theory that such an increase
is necessary for technological efficiency should be treated with dis-
trust.
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